Philosophy has developed a rich taxonomy of fallacies, all of which suffer from the lack of authority fallacy. That is, there can be competing theories of what constitutes an etymological fallacy, or a redefinition fallacy. You would need to interview the philosophers to see what consensus there is on how to classify particular fallacies.
Whether or not this fallacy is generally accepted by philosophers or has another name, what you offer is an instance of the fallacy argumentum ad dictionarium, which is a sub-case of argumentum ad verecundiam (argument from authority). Generative linguists implicitly accept the Humpty Dumpty fallacy ("when I use a word, it means just what I choose it to mean, either more nor less") because language is a matter of individual psychology, and we reject the claim that a person is in linguistic error if they do not conform with (a) the dictionary, (b) the usage of the majority of speakers, (c) the usage of those whom they are addressing. We dislike saying how people should speak, so as a descriptive matter, "glory" might mean "a nice knock-down argument" for some people. Some linguists are sociolinguists, and they can describe statistical patterns in a certain social context, so they might observe that "sick" means "good" in a certain context, but they would not accept the unqualified claim that "sick" means "good" (nor would they say "sick doesn't mean good").
All of this is 99.99% irrelevant to philosophy, much of which is based on the Unquestioned Common Ground fallacy. In professional discourse in philosophy, common ground is not a fallacy and word meaning is more standardized, just as when we linguists talk about our subject matter, we have somewhat well-defined shared vocabulary owing to our professional training. The various species of semantic disputes are vastly more common in non-professional arguments, e.g. on the internet.