Does arguing that a usage of a word doesn't match the current, modern definition, count as etymological fallacy?

What I'm getting at is, if I say a usage isn't right and should be corrected, and someone says my argument is etymology fallacy..Is it so, if the current definition still matches the original, and therefore I am not advocating for the first usage,or outdated roots of the word?

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    If you say a usage isn't right and should be corrected, you're required to be able to present evidence, and to have a definition of "right" that doesn't stop at your opinion. So it doesn't matter what anybody says about it; what matters is what evidence you present and whether you define right right. And it certainly doesn't matter what it's called.
    – jlawler
    Jul 31 '20 at 19:37

Philosophy has developed a rich taxonomy of fallacies, all of which suffer from the lack of authority fallacy. That is, there can be competing theories of what constitutes an etymological fallacy, or a redefinition fallacy. You would need to interview the philosophers to see what consensus there is on how to classify particular fallacies.

Whether or not this fallacy is generally accepted by philosophers or has another name, what you offer is an instance of the fallacy argumentum ad dictionarium, which is a sub-case of argumentum ad verecundiam (argument from authority). Generative linguists implicitly accept the Humpty Dumpty fallacy ("when I use a word, it means just what I choose it to mean, either more nor less") because language is a matter of individual psychology, and we reject the claim that a person is in linguistic error if they do not conform with (a) the dictionary, (b) the usage of the majority of speakers, (c) the usage of those whom they are addressing. We dislike saying how people should speak, so as a descriptive matter, "glory" might mean "a nice knock-down argument" for some people. Some linguists are sociolinguists, and they can describe statistical patterns in a certain social context, so they might observe that "sick" means "good" in a certain context, but they would not accept the unqualified claim that "sick" means "good" (nor would they say "sick doesn't mean good").

All of this is 99.99% irrelevant to philosophy, much of which is based on the Unquestioned Common Ground fallacy. In professional discourse in philosophy, common ground is not a fallacy and word meaning is more standardized, just as when we linguists talk about our subject matter, we have somewhat well-defined shared vocabulary owing to our professional training. The various species of semantic disputes are vastly more common in non-professional arguments, e.g. on the internet.

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    My answer neither allows nor prohibits definitions. EF can mean to you whatever you want it to mean, and it can mean to me whatever I want it to mean to me. In the context of professional philosophical usage, argument from dictionary is not an instance of EF. Beats me whether there actually is any social context where it is claimed to be a case of EF.
    – user6726
    Jul 31 '20 at 18:03
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    Hayakawa's Language in Thought and Action has a great chapter about how dictionaries are developed, which presents the relative nature of signs quite intuitively. Likely available at your local library. Jul 31 '20 at 20:20

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